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Liability Insurance at the Tort-Crime Boundary
Tom Baker*
Liability insurance defines the boundaries of tort law-in-action in a
variety of ways. As a formal matter tort law generally ignores whether
defendants have liability insurance, as well as the prevailing verbal and
dollar limits on that insurance. (Stapleton 1995)1 Yet, liability insurance is
close to a de facto element of tort liability whenever the potential
defendants are individuals, and liability insurance even shapes claims
against large, well-funded organizations. (Baker 2006, Black et al 2006,
Zeiler et al forthcoming. Cf. Baker & Griffith). Tort liability certainly
exists out from under the liability insurance umbrella, but tort lawyers do
not go out there very often, because there is less return in it. While there
are exceptions, lawyers prefer to ask a liability insurer to pay – because
paying claims is the business of liability insurance. (Baker 2001) For this
reason, liability insurance must be counted among the sites in which to
investigate the relationship between tort law and culture. Whatever legal
culture is, it surely affects liability insurance institutions, and these, in turn,
affect – and are affected by – the development of tort law.
This essay explores how liability insurance mediates the boundary
between torts and crime. Liability insurance sometimes separates these two
legal fields, for example through the application of standard insurance
contract provisions that exclude insurance coverage for some crimes that
are also torts. These exclusions largely remove these crimes from the reach
of civil law, as demonstrated, for example, by the dearth of tort claims
involving domestic violence, molestation, and other assaults,
notwithstanding the prevalence of these crimes in the U.S. (Wriggins
2001). With respect to these crime-torts, liability insurance operates to
create a greater de facto separation between tort and criminal liabilities
where, de jure, the two liabilities would appear to overlap.
Perhaps less obviously, liability insurance also can draw parts of the
tort and criminal fields together. For example, professional liability
insurance civilizes the criminal law experience for some crimes that are
*
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also torts by providing defendants with an insurance-paid criminal defense
that provides more than ordinary means to contest the state’s accusations.
Notable examples include the recent spate of high profile white-collar
prosecutions involving former executives from Enron, HealthSouth, and
WorldCom, in which directors’ and officers’ liability insurers helped fund
the criminal defense. (Brickey 2006) The availability of liability insurance
for the criminal defense both reflects and signals that these crimes are more
like torts than other crimes and, perhaps, that the defendants are not real
criminals. (Cf., Singer and Husack 1999, Mann 1991)
On the books and in theory, criminal and civil liability are governed by
largely independent norms and institutions. (Steiker 1997; but see Becker
1968) In effect, tort and criminal liability occupy different legal
dimensions and, thus, the idea of a boundary between them might seem to
make little sense. An act can be both a crime and a tort, and whether it falls
into one of those categories typically has little to do with whether it falls
into the other. The most obvious exception to the independence of tort and
criminal law occurs when criminal law supplies a legal standard to tort law,
for example through the doctrine of negligence per se. (Dobbs 2000 at 215).
Here, the dominant spatial metaphor is overlap, not boundary.
In practice, however, torts and crime do constitute different fields in
the “good fences make good neighbors” sense, and, continuing that
metaphor, liability insurance forms part of the fence between them.
Liability insurance distinguishes between people and acts that are governed
by the “hard treatment” of criminal justice institutions (Hart 1968) and
people and acts that are governed by civil justice. Only the state has the
power to “govern through crime” (Simon 2007), but liability insurance
markets help determine the extent to which civil justice retreats in response.
As Kenneth Abraham has described, liability insurance grew up
together with tort law over the course of the 20th century. (Abraham 2008)
Liability insurance did not exist until the 1880s, and in the 19th century tort
claims were rare events. (Id; Rabin 1999) In a symbiotic relationship, the
new tort liabilities associated with industrialization, the automobile, and
other new forms of activity created a demand for liability insurance,
liability insurance stimulated the growth of tort claiming, the growth of tort
claiming increased the demand for liability insurance, and so on. (See also
Syverud 1994,Yeazell 2001, and Pandya 2007).
Like the underlying tort liabilities to which they apply, liability
insurance policies might at first seem to be unrelated to the criminal
dimension of the legal universe. Indeed, one can search the early liability
insurance literature in vain for any reference either to crime or criminal
liability. This silence is consistent with the traditional view of liability
insurance offered by philosophers of tort law. In that view, tort liability
comes first, creating rights and obligations, and liability insurance comes
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second, merely shifting the financial burdens of these tort obligations to the
insurance pool. (E.g., Waldron 1995; Stapleton 1995) Wherever tort law
goes, liability insurance follows, and there is no need in the liability
insurance arena for consideration of the nature or limits of the underlying
liability, except perhaps when there are economic or technical issues that
affect the operation of liability insurance itself.
Yet, as Mary Coate McNeely first described in the Columbia Law
Review in 1941, liability insurers have from the beginning struggled to
separate liability insurance from crime for reasons that are not purely
economic or technical. (McNeely 1941)2 Moreover, as I shall argue, this
struggle affects the underlying tort liabilities themselves, challenging tort
theorists’ hierarchical understanding of the relationship between tort and
liability insurance.
Professor McNeely locates the struggle over liability insurance
coverage for crime-torts within a larger story about “Illegality as a Factor in
Liability Insurance,” and the story she tells is a familiar one in the insurance
law genre. Denials of insurance coverage based on broad principles and
exhortations to public policy gradually but surely fail, leading insurance
underwriters to sharpen their pencils and write exclusionary provisions in
their insurance contracts that courts largely enforce. (E.g., Rossmiller 2007)
The preoccupation with crime is also familiar within the insurance genre.
Life and fire insurers struggled for much of the 19th century to avoid
association with crime (Zelizer 1979, Baker 1997), and the insurance
adjuster as detective remains a staple of crime fiction today.3
Allowing for differences in style and ambition, much of Professor
McNeely’s article could have been written today. Insurance institutions
continue to refine the standard form contract provisions they use to exclude
coverage for tort claims arising out of crimes, and they continue to justify
this effort using the forms of reasoning that she identifies: consequentialist
reasoning that distinguishes among illegal acts according to ideas about
incentives that today we call moral hazard (see e.g., Heimer 1985) and
moral reasoning that distinguishes among illegal acts according to degrees
of blameworthiness.
Few commentators today would agree with Professor McNeely’s
ultimate conclusion, however. She predicted that the emerging concept of
liability insurance as a victim compensation fund would replace the old
fashioned concept of liability insurance as protection for the defendant and,
as a result, liability insurers would gradually abandon the effort to exclude
coverage for torts arising out of crimes. Today this prediction seems as
2
Of note to insurance scholars, the article was adapted from her master’s thesis
written under the direction of Edwin Patterson.
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quaintly utopian as the related but more familiar prediction that the concept
of social insurance would take over tort law. (Cf. Sebok 2003) To be sure,
liability insurance is a victim compensation fund, but it is not only that –
and not even primarily that, except in workers compensation (which hardly
is considered to be liability insurance anymore) and, perhaps, in auto
insurance. Indeed, the move to extend the compensation idea beyond
workers compensation has made very little progress in the nearly 70 years
since McNeely’s article. (Abraham 2008) The one possible exception may
have been products liability, but whatever force there was in the social
insurance concept of product liability law is, at the very least, dissipating.
(Schwartz 1981 & 1992. Cf. Stapleton 1995)
In the sections that follow I expand on four points suggested by a
contemporary rereading of Professor McNeely’s mid-20th century treatment
of liability insurance and crime. First, I confirm that liability insurers
continue to use contract provisions that exclude claims arising out of
criminal acts. Second, I demonstrate that the crime-tort separation in
liability insurance cannot be explained by economic incentives, alone.
Morality matters, too. Third, I argue that this separation both reflects and
reinforces a concept of liability insurance as protection for defendants,
rather than as a fund for victims. Fourth, I argue that this concept of
insurance, in turn, both reflects and reinforces an understanding of tort
claims as encounters between particular plaintiffs and defendants, rather
than as a price setting or loss spreading insurance mechanism.
In a concluding section, I describe situations in which liability
insurance provides coverage for criminal defense costs. I argue that this
extension of liability insurance into the criminal field suggests that liability
insurance institutions could cover a broader swath of crime torts than they
do, providing further support for the claim that consequentialist reasoning,
alone, cannot explain the observed relationship between liability insurance,
torts, and crime.
A. Excluding Crime-Torts from Liability Insurance Contracts
Liability insurance contracts today limit liability insurers’
responsibility for crime-tort losses in four ways.
First, although liability insurance contracts provide broad defense and
indemnity coverage for tort proceedings and tort damages, they typically do
not provide defense coverage for criminal proceedings, and, to my
knowledge, they never provide any coverage for criminal fines or
penalties.4 This means, for example, that a driver charged with driving
under the influence after running over a pedestrian, will get a tort defense
4
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to the tort-crime boundary is a topic for future work.

5

lawyer from his insurance company, but not a criminal defense lawyer.
Moreover, if the driver is assessed a fine as part of his punishment for a
DWI conviction, the insurance company will not pay or reimburse him for
that fine, even though the insurer will readily pay much larger amounts of
money to settle the associated tort action or to satisfy a tort judgment.
The fact that some liability insurance policies today do provide
criminal defense coverage (as I will discuss in the concluding section of this
chapter) brings this aspect of the separation into greater relief. Indeed, the
fact that no liability insurance policies appear to have provided criminal
defense coverage in the 1940s may explain why Professor McNeely did not
even mention it. This aspect of the crime-tort separation in liability
insurance may have been so obvious and accepted that she did not even
notice it.
Second, liability insurance contracts generally contain clauses that
exclude coverage for claims arising out of intentional injuries by the
insured. These clauses do not explicitly withdraw liability insurance from
crime-torts. But, in addition to the obvious economic explanation (moral
hazard), they reflect concerns about the propriety of insulating people from
the consequences of criminal actions. Indeed, when enforcing intentional
harm exclusions, courts commonly stress the criminal nature of the conduct
in question and refer in moralistic terms to the public policy concerns that
would be raised by providing insurance for crime.5 This justification is an
echo of the earlier, general principle Professor McNeely described.
Although courts today would be unlikely to uphold the denial of coverage
based on this broad principle in the absence of an explicit contract
provision,6 the principle nevertheless retains some value as an explanation
for these contract provisions.
Third, some liability insurance contracts contain clauses that exclude
coverage for punitive damages, and some courts allow insurance companies
to refuse to pay for punitive damages even in the absence of such
exclusionary language. (Sharkey 2005) Like exclusions for intentional
harm, these explicit and implicit exclusions for punitive damages do not
directly withdraw liability insurance from crime, but they do withdraw
liability insurance from punishment, a defining aspect of criminal remedies.
(Hart 1968) Moreover, courts that allow insurance companies to refuse to
pay punitive damages commonly stress the criminal nature of the conduct
in question and the similarity between punitive damages and criminal fines.
(Sharkey 2005) Instead of withdrawing liability insurance entirely from the
5

See, e.g. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co v. Martin 660 A.2d 66 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995); Blackman v. Wright, 716 A.2d 648 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Sullivan v. Equity
Fire & Cas. Co., 889 P.2d 1285 (Okla. App. 1995); and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Wertz, 540 N.W. 2d 636 (S.D. 1995) (compiled by RA – need to check.).
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tort claim in question, a punitive damages exclusion withdraws coverage
from the quasi-criminal aspect of the tort law remedy. Like the public
policy based prohibition of insurance for intentional harm, the prohibition
on insurance for punitive damages appears to be on the wane.7
Nevertheless, the reasoning behind both prohibitions suggests that explicit
exclusions for intentional harm and punitive damages in liability insurance
contracts can be understood as part of the crime-tort separation.
Fourth, many liability insurance contracts contain additional clauses
that specifically state that the insurer will not pay for tort claims arising out
of criminal acts, whether the resulting injuries were intentional or not.
These clauses are the most explicit manifestation of the crime-tort
separation, and they include broadly worded exclusions that eliminate
coverage for foreseeable injuries from any “criminal act” as well as more
narrowly worded exclusions that eliminate coverage for injuries related to
specific crimes, such as molestation. These criminal act exclusions appear
in some professional liability insurance policies that include coverage for
some criminal defense costs, so the tort-crime separation in those parts of
the tort and liability insurance field is far from complete. But these
criminal act exclusions have also begun to appear in homeowners’
insurance policies, which never provide coverage for criminal defense
costs. (Eidsmoe & Edwards 1998-99).
The homeowners’ insurance
company may still have to pay for some or all of the tort defense costs of
the alleged criminal, and that tort defense obligation gives these crime-tort
cases a settlement value for insurance companies.
(Pryor 1997)
Nevertheless, the insurers putting these clauses in their contracts clearly
aim to reduce the extent to which they have to pay for any costs related to
criminal activity, and the courts on the whole support that effort. (Baker
2008 at 449).
B. The Limits of the Moral Hazard Explanation
For people accustomed to thinking about law in economic terms, moral
hazard might at first seem to provide an obvious and important part of the
explanation for the insurance contract provisions just described. Moral
hazard – the tendency for insurance to reduce the incentive to prevent loss –
is a longstanding concern in all kinds of insurance, and liability insurance is
no exception. (Baker 1996) Almost all tort liabilities involve harm that
potential defendants can avoid to at least some degree, if only by reducing
the extent to which they or people they control engage in activity that may
cause harm. Indeed, in economic analysis, loss prevention is the primary
7
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insurable. See Baker 1998b for an explanation of how large corporations are able
to obtain offshore insurance that indemnifies the corporation for punitive damages
assessed in jurisdictions in which such insurance is contrary to public policy.
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justification for tort liability. (Shavell 1987) Thus, to the extent that
liability provides an incentive to take care, all liability insurance creates at
least the potential for moral hazard. (Shavell 1979).
In that regard at least, insurance for crime-torts is hardly alone. The
question is whether the incentive problem becomes significantly more
serious when a tort is also a crime. If so, then moral hazard provides a
satisfying explanation for the crime-tort separation. If not, we need to look
elsewhere.
As a moment’s reflection should be sufficient to make clear, criminal
liability does not exacerbate the moral hazard created by liability insurance.
Rather, criminal liability reduces moral hazard. Adding criminal liability on
top of tort liability helps offset the moral hazard of providing insurance for
the related tort liability, at least as long as the criminal penalty is not
insured, and, to my knowledge, it never is.
When the criminal penalties include going to jail, the presence or
absence of liability insurance seems likely to have little or no effect on
incentives. Even a short stay in a jail cell surely would loom larger in the
imagination than an uninsured tort liability. Moreover, if person in
question knows very much about the real life operation of the tort system,
she knows that the odds are very strongly against a tort lawsuit if there is
not any insurance. (Gilles 2006) Given almost any prospect of criminal
law enforcement involving imprisonment, the presence or absence of
liability insurance seems likely to affect only slightly the expected cost of
crime, ex ante.
It is of course possible to imagine a crime-tort for which the only
criminal liability is a small fine, and for which there are no significant
shame or other non-monetary sanctions attached to a criminal conviction.
In that event, the criminal liability would not do much to offset any moral
hazard created by the insurance that covers the associated tort. But I predict
that insurance companies would be willing to offer tort liability insurance in
all such cases (subject to ordinary moral hazard control measures), because
the small size of the fine relative to the potential injury would indicate that
society does not strongly condemn the activity and therefore that the moral
objections to the insurance would not be substantial.
Traffic laws provide a good example. Speeding, crossing a solid
yellow line, going the wrong way on a one-way street, and other traffic law
violations are, as Professor McNeely described, criminal offenses in many
jurisdictions, and these traffic violations are subject to fines that are small
relative to the potential harm. Yet, insurance against tort liabilities for
traffic crime-torts is universally available. True, insurance will not pay for
the speeding ticket or any other traffic-related fine. But the cost of those
fines pales in comparison to the potential damages that a liability insurer
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would readily pay in the event a serious accident results from the traffic law
violation.
I do not mean to suggest that liability insurance for crime-torts never
poses a moral hazard problem. Instead, I suggest simply that the criminal
status or label does not create or exacerbate the moral hazard and, all other
things being equal, the potential for criminal liability actually reduces that
problem.8 Of course, all other things often are not equal. In particular,
crime-torts do seem more likely to involve intentional harm than other torts.
But the higher degree of moral hazard that might be created by providing
liability insurance for such crime-torts results from the intentional nature of
the harm, not the criminal status of the offense.
A further demonstration of the limits of the moral hazard explanation
comes from the fact that there is an easily implemented and arguably more
effective approach to managing the moral hazard of liability insurance for
intentional harm than simply excluding coverage under the liability
insurance contract. Under this alternative approach, the liability insurance
contract would provide coverage for the tort, and the liability insurance
company would manage the moral hazard by subrogation – i.e., by going
after the insured to recoup the money paid to the victim.9
If anything, this pay and then subrogate approach would provide
greater deterrence than the current approach of excluding insurance
coverage for intentional harm.
Because of the liability insurance
exclusions, almost no one bothers to bring a tort claim for many crime-torts,
unless there is a third party who was merely negligent or who can be held
vicariously liable (Rabin 1999), with the result that the civil law in action
often provides no real sanction for the criminal tortfeasor. (Baker 1998a;
Pryor 1997)10 For crimes involving family and friends, the absence of civil
sanction can mean that there is no legal sanction at all, because family and
friends are reluctant to call in the criminal law, as the domestic violence and
acquaintance rape situations suggest. (Wriggins 2001).
8
A possible exception, discussed in Wriggins 2001, might be crime-torts in which
the perpetrator believes that the victim will share the liability insurance proceeds
with the perpetrator. As Wriggins discusses, this is a possible concern in the
domestic violence context.
9
In cases involving intentional harm, the usual rule prohibiting insurance
companies from subrogating against their own insureds does not apply. See, e.g.,
Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 388 A.2d 603 (N.J. 1978).
10
The one obvious exception is drunk driving, because the overwhelmingly
compensatory purpose of compulsory automobile liability insurance has prevented
automobile insurance companies from putting drunk driving exclusions in their
policies. (Schermer) The divorce context may be another significant exception to
this generalization. Apparently, tort claims arising out of spousal abuse are not
uncommon in the divorce context, particularly when there are significant assets in
the spousal estate or held separately by the husband. See Ira Mark Ellman and
Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional Abuse as a Tort? 55 Md. L. Rev. 1268
(1996). Thank you to Anne Dailey for bringing this to my attention.
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Providing liability insurance for intentional harm could change that
situation. With liability insurance money at stake, the civil law process
would at the very least announce the wrong and, possibly, shame the
defendant. (Hampton 1992) In addition, the public nature of the tort suit and
subsequent subrogation action might even increase the chance that criminal
prosecutors would get involved.
Moreover, plaintiffs might well refuse to settle without some payment
of “blood money” on the part of the defendant, as occurs in drunk driving
tort claims. (Baker 2001) Even a small blood money payment is more than
the zero payment that would be assessed when a plaintiff cannot bring a tort
action because there is no liability insurance policy that makes the claim
worthwhile for a contingent fee lawyer. As a repeat player, the liability
insurer would enjoy some advantage over the individual plaintiff in actually
collecting money from the wrongdoer, so the defendants may well be
required to pay even more money in subrogation. (Cf., Gilles 2006 on the
difficulties involved). In combination, the blood money and subrogation
possibilities may have the, superficially surprising, consequence that
intentional tortfeasors whose liability insurance policies include coverage
for intentional injuries would be more likely to pay some of their own
money to plaintiffs than intentional tortfeasors whose liability insurance
policies exclude that coverage.
If the real problem with insuring domestic violence, rape, and other
assaults were moral hazard, then something like this pay and then subrogate
approach would at least be on the public policy agenda for discussion. Yet
it is not. The leading appellate decision supporting this approach, the New
Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Ambassador Insurance v. Montes, 11 has
11

76 N.J. 477, 388 A.2d 603 (1978). In that case, Ambassador Insurance Company
asked the New Jersey courts to declare that it had no duty to defend or pay for a
wrongful death claim. The claim arose out of a crime for which Ambassador’s
policyholder was convicted and sent to prison: he burned down a building in the
middle of the night knowing that his tenants were inside. The trial court agreed
with Ambassador that liability insurance did not cover that claim and granted
summary judgment. When the landlord appealed, however, it became clear that
the insurance policy in the official record did not contain an intentional harm
exclusion, and the landlord argued for reversal on that ground. The appellate court
rejected the landlord’s contract-based argument and, like the late 19th century court
decisions that Professor McNeely reviewed, held that no explicit exclusion was
necessary because liability insurance for intentional harm is against public policy.
On further appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, as McNeely would
have predicted, on the grounds that the policy did not contain an explicit contract
provision excluding claims arising out of intentional harm. The court used this
unusual situation to state emphatically that liability insurance for intentional harm
does not violate public policy because the proceeds of the insurance policy go to
the victim, not the criminal. Moreover, as the court explained, this insurance
would not create a dangerous incentive because the liability insurance company
would be free to bring a subrogation action against the policyholder to recoup the
money it had paid to the victim. (The fact that, as a practical matter, the insurance
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been confined to its facts.12 Professor Wriggins’ proposal to require
personal liability insurance policies to cover domestic violence has gone
nowhere. And I can barely even persuade my law students to consider the
benefits of liability insurance for intentional harm.
Why? Because their main concern about insurance for crime-torts is
not, in fact, the effect of liability insurance on incentives. Instead, as my
students strenuously argue, it is simply not fair for law-abiding liability
insurance policyholders to have to pay, through their insurance premiums,
for the costs of rapists’ or arsonists’ crimes. They object, in other words,
that liability insurance protects defendants, and that some defendants –
rapists and arsonists for example – do not deserve the protection.
Of course, as I always respond, potential victims also share the costs of
any liability insurance compensation, either through their own liability
insurance premiums or through the prices that they pay for goods and
services that they buy from businesses with liability insurance, just as
consumers share the costs of products liability and workers share the costs
of workers compensation. (Cf. Stapleton 1995) I respond, in other words,
that liability insurance protects victims. If any victims deserve that
protection, victims of serious crime-torts like arson and rape surely do.
Professor McNeely surely would have agreed with this argument, as
would Justice Traynor and other supporters of the social insurance approach
to tort liability, but not my students. “Nice move,” is the typical response,
“but I’m not persuaded.” Almost universally, my students remain firmly of
the view that liability insurance protects the defendant, and that it is wrong
for liability insurance to provide that protection in a case involving a “real”
crime.
Although this classroom experience hardly constitutes conclusive
proof, repetition over many years has persuaded me. Liability insurance
separates crimes from torts, not primarily because of concerns about the
increased cost due to moral hazard, but rather because of moral objections
to including some criminals in the liability insurance pool.13
company would be unlikely to bring an action against a criminal sitting in jail has
no bearing on the question of incentives: if the defendant has no assets and no
insurance, the victim would be equally unlikely to bring an action.)
12
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Malec, 514 A.2d 832 (N.J. 1986).
13
I should be clear that an insurer may not be able to unilaterally adopt the pay and
then subrogate approach, for reasons sketched in Baker 2008 at 437-38. In short,
few people would choose to purchase a, more expensive, liability insurance policy
that authorized the insurance company to pay the victim and then pursue them, so
cheaper policies with an intentional harm exclusion can be expected to dominate
the market. But a state legislature or insurance regulator could easily solve that
problem by requiring all liability insurance policies in a specified market to be
structured in this way. To those who object that the pay and then subrogate
approach would be impractical, I point to the automobile insurance market. Auto
liability policies generally contain intentional harm exclusions, but uninsured
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C. The Crime-Tort Separation and Liability Insurance as Defense
Protection
The crime-tort separation not only reflects a concept of liability
insurance as protection for defendants, it also reinforces that concept.
Intentional harm and criminal act exclusions produce a claims-handling
structure that regularly performs the understanding of liability insurance as
defendant protection. In that structure, insurance adjusters regularly
investigate whether tort claims arise out of crime and, if so, they initiate the
legal process that permits them to withhold or withdraw insurance
protection.
The following (long) quotation from an article by two insurance
defense lawyers illustrates this point:
The axiom that bad facts make bad law could not have been any
truer than in the case of Robert A. Berdella. In 1984, Berdella, a Kansas
City, Missouri area resident went on a four-year torture and killing
spree. Over that period of time Berdella killed at least six men, all in
gruesome fashion. ... When police investigated Berdella's home, they
found human skulls, photographs of men being sodomized and tortured,
and journal notes describing the torture. … The criminal record
indicated that Berdella injected the victims with drugs and kept them
alive for his "perverted desires." …
Civil suits were filed against Berdella's estate by the victim's
families for wrongful death. Although Berdella had only $63,000 in
personal assets, he did have a homeowners insurance policy with
$100,000 per occurrence limits (arguably each murder could have been a
separate occurrence). Berdella was insured by Economy Fire and
Casualty Company (Economy). In the wrongful death actions, the
plaintiffs attempted to trigger coverage by alleging that Berdella's
actions amounted to negligence. In response, Economy filed a separate
declaratory judgment action, citing its common policy language found in
all home liability policies (in one form or another) that excludes liability
coverage for bodily injury or property damage "expected or intended"
from the standpoint of the insured. …
The Court of Appeals ruled that the mere fact that Berdella pled
guilty to three counts of second degree murder did not establish that he
intended to kill the three men for purposes of the civil or the declaratory
actions. … By finding that Berdella intended to torture his victims but
did not expect or intend to kill them, the court handed the case back to
the jury. This decision also placed the case back into the realm of
potential coverage under Economy's homeowner's policy.

motorists (UM) coverage typically steps in to fill the gap, and the insurance
company that issued the UM policy is permitted to subrogate against the tortfeasor.
This approach is even more unwieldy than what I am suggesting (because two
different liability insurance companies are involved), but it achieves essentially the
same end. (Cf. Wriggins 2001 arguing for using the uninsured motorists approach
to compensate victims of domestic violence.)
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The rest is history. The resulting jury verdict in the civil case, one
year after the Court of Appeals ruling on the declaratory judgment
action still stands today as the highest compensatory award in United
States legal history. The livid jurors awarded the Stoops family $5
billion ($2.5 billion for wrongful death and $2.5 billion for "aggravating
circumstances"). Although Economy had planned to appeal the verdict,
its policy of insurance also covered pre-and post-judgment interest on
the entire judgment. The interest on $5 billion amounted to $600,000 a
day! Economy was forced to settle the claim rather than appeal and risk
insolvency on the outcome of one appeal. Economy paid the Stoops
family $2.5 million. The death claims presented by the Howell and
Ferris families were settled out of court for undisclosed sums. …
(Eidsmore & Edwards)

The Berdella case is just one, particularly graphic example from an
entire genre of moral monster stories that have emerged in the insurance
case law out of the effort to enforce the crime-tort separation. These stories
feature drunken brawlers, wife batterers, child molesters, doctors and
dentists who rape sedated patients, and other moral monsters who commit a
second crime by asking the insurance company to pay for their first one.
Among published opinions, the Berdella case is unusual principally in the
fact that the insurance company lost. For that reason, it played an
important, “never again” role in the subsequent effort to include a criminal
acts exclusion in some homeowners’ insurance policies.14
It is easy to see these moral monster stories as a result of the crime-tort
separation, but they also reproduce that separation. They allow insurance
companies to occupy the moral high ground while refusing to pay victims
who indisputably deserve compensation. The stories place the spotlight of
attention on the moral monster, not the deserving victim, and they
appropriate the victim’s wrong for the insurance company. In the process,
they legitimate a crime-tort separation that makes the outrage in the
Berdella insurance case the fact that Berdella’s insurance company had to
pay, rather than the fact that the company for years refused to pay the
victims’ families. (Cf. Baker 1994, describing the claims story of the
immoral insured; Ericson et al 2004 describing insureds as suspects)
At least in part as a result of the crime-tort separation in liability
insurance, the more clearly intentional or criminal the harm, the less likely
the perpetrator will be called to account in a civil forum, and the less likely
the victim will receive real compensation, given the well-recognized
inadequacy of the public compensation funds for criminal victims.15 (E.g.,
14

As of fall 2008, Allstate is the largest U.S. homeowners’ insurer to include this
exclusion. State Farm (among others) does not ordinarily use such an exclusion.
15
The two exceptions to this morally objectionable situation in the United States
today are the same two fields that Professor McNeely mentioned in 1941: crimes
at work and crimes involving automobiles. If an employer intentionally injures a
worker, the worker not only gets to collect workers’ compensation benefits, he also
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Levmore & Logue 2003) In my view, this result is morally objectionable,
but that opinion is only tangential to my main point here: Ideas about the
nature of liability insurance affect tort law on the ground. (Cf. Ewald 1991
on the power of “insurance imaginaries”)
There are, it should be acknowledged, two mitigating developments in
U.S. tort practice. First, the growth of what Robert Rabin has aptly named
“enabling torts” means that victims sometimes are able to recover from
non-criminal third parties whose conduct can be causally linked to the
crime, although this growth has been subject to counter-attack in the form
of legislative restrictions on joint and several liability. (Rabin 1999) For
example, a building owner may be sued for inadequate security in the event
of a rape or other assault in the building. Second, common law rules
relating to insurers’ duty to defend and settle claims have facilitated a
practice of “underlitigation” – e.g., pleading an intentional tort as a
negligent tort – that may help victims in cases in which the evidence on
intent is less than clear. (Pryor 1997, Baker 1998a). Notwithstanding these
developments, however, domestic violence, acquaintance rape, and most
other assaults remain largely outside the reach of tort law – not because of
technical limits on what can and cannot be the subject of liability insurance,
but rather because of an understanding of, and commitment to, liability
insurance as defendant protection.
At a more general level, the crime-tort separation in liability insurance
and the accompanying moral monster stories also reflect and reproduce an
understanding of a tort claim as an encounter between a specific plaintiff
and a specific defendant, rather than as the price setting or loss spreading
mechanism that a social engineer might describe. There are, of course,
other institutions that promote this individualized, corrective justice
understanding of tort law, but the crime-tort separation in liability insurance
is special because it operates within an institution – insurance – that, in so
many other ways, promotes the price setting and loss spreading approaches.
Thanks in part to the crime-tort separation, a liability insurance claims
file is not just an administrative record classifying the nature and economic
value of bodily injury or other harm. Instead, the claims file is also an
inquiry into the state of mind of the defendant. Like every other aspect of
the claims-handling process, this inquiry undoubtedly becomes routinized
and subject to rules of thumb that reduce the individualized nature of the
inquiry (Ross 1970). Nevertheless, the crime-tort separation provides an
gets to bring a tort action against the employer (despite the fact that, ordinarily,
workers’ compensation precludes tort claims against the employer). The auto
insurance situation is a bit more complicated (reflecting the fact that auto insurance
never completed the transformation to a victim compensation fund that McNeely
predicted), but victims of intentional harm usually are able to recover: if the
driver’s insurer does not have to pay, the victim’s uninsured motorists’ insurer
usually will have to pay. (Schermer)
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additional fault-line, beyond those provided by tort law, along which the
bureaucratic claims handling process can break down, releasing the
individualized drama of litigation.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored how liability insurance separates the tort and
criminal fields by withdrawing insurance protection for crime-torts. Before
concluding, I will complicate this picture by briefly describing how liability
insurance makes the criminal law experience more like the tort law
experience for some defendants in some cases.
Despite the exclusion of coverage for criminal fines and penalties,
some liability insurance contracts do provide coverage for criminal defense
costs. I have found this criminal defense coverage in two kinds of liability
insurance policies: (1) in professional liability policies sold to high status
professionals, such as directors’ and officers’ liability insurance16 and
medical liability insurance,17 and (2) in an excess liability insurance policy
available to members of the National Rifle Association.18
This coverage civilizes, to at least some degree, the criminal defense
experience by providing the means for the criminal defendant to contest the
state’s allegations. In-depth exploration of this insurance coverage awaits
future work. Topics to be addressed include: the history of the coverage,
the reasons liability insurers offered for its introduction, and whether there
was any resistance on the part of insurance regulators or courts; whether
there are features of the criminal liabilities likely to be covered that
suggests that they are somehow less “criminal” than paradigmatic crimes;
and what, if anything, liability insurers do to address potential adverse
selection concerns (i.e. that policies with this coverage might be
systematically more appealing to higher risk applicants).
For present purposes, the existence of these limited forms of criminal
defense coverage simply highlights the absence of this protection in other
forms of liability insurance and also provides additional evidence that
liability insurers could, as a technical matter, expand the range of services
they provide to defendants accused of crime-torts, without running into
insurmountable moral hazard or adverse selection problems.
This
strengthens the claim that economic incentives do not adequately explain
the crime-tort separation in liability insurance.
16

D&O insurance defines the operative terms “claim” and “defense expenses”
broadly enough to include criminal defense costs. (E.g., Executive Risk 1996).
17
Medical liability insurance provides ongoing criminal defense cost coverage for
“criminal charges against an Insured Person arising out of the rendering of or
failure to render Medical Services.” (E.g., Executive Risk 1998).
18
The NRA’s liability insurance policy promises to reimburse criminal defense
costs in cases involving self-defense, as long as the charges eventually are dropped
or there is an acquittal. See http://www.locktonrisk.com/nrains/selfdefense.asp (last
visited December 2, 2007).
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